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This is the English version of the following book chapter : Cristina Chimisso “Voyage vers le 
matérialisme : François Dagognet et l’évolution de l’épistémologie historique” in B. Bensaude-Vincent, 
J-F Braunstein, J. Gayon (eds) François Dagognet : Philosophe, épistémologue, Paris, Éditions 
Materiologiques, 2019. 
Please cite the published French version.  
A journey towards materialism: François Dagognet and the evolution 
of historical epistemology 
 
Introduction 
 
How can reason grasp the natural world? This has long been the central problem of 
epistemology. Reason and reality appear to be heterogeneous and the solutions to bridge 
their difference have been numerous. Philosophers in the tradition that we are now used to 
call ‘historical epistemology’1 have had a particular approach to it: they have aimed to 
overcome the dichotomy between reason and reality, and in so doing to eliminate the 
question of the relationship between the two from philosophy.  The distinctiveness of their 
approach includes the historicisation of both reason and nature, and the centrality of the 
sciences as the motor of change. It goes without saying that the question of what historical 
epistemology is, and which philosophers should be included under this label is far from 
settled. Some critics use this label normatively, and include philosophies according to their 
fundamental characteristics; others historically, and focus on intellectual traditions and 
milieus.2 I shall not be concerned with these general problems here, but I shall indicate the 
philosophical ‘ingredients’ that in my view are at the core of historical epistemology, 
although these should not be seen as rigid characteristics. These ingredients are the 
normative part of my case for including Léon Brunschvicg at one end of the chronological 
span and François Dagognet at the other. From a historical point of view, the case for the 
inclusion of Brunschvicg and Dagognet is easily made.  
My focus will be much narrower than a discussion of historical epistemology. I shall only 
discuss an aspect of the attempts to overcome the dichotomy between reason and reality 
undertaken in historical epistemology. I shall concentrate, for reasons of pertinence and 
space, only on three philosophers: Léon Brunschvicg, Gaston Bachelard and François 
                                                     
1 For the introduction and use of the expression ‘historical epistemology’ see (Lecourt 1972); (Foucault 1996); 
(Gayon 1998); (Rheinberger 2005b). 
2 Critics writing in French are more inclined than those writing in English to have a normative rather than 
historical approach, and as a consequence include Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, as for instance 
Anastasios Brenner has done (Brenner 2006), or Feyerabend and Imre Latakos, as Denis Vernant has done 
((Vernant 1990). Canguilhem called Kuhn’s philosophy ‘historical epistemology’ (Canguilhem 1994 [1968]). 
Jean-François Braunstein, on the other hand, isolates traits of a French style in history and philosophy of 
science (rather than a school), and argues that approaches such as Fleck’s, Crombie’s and Hacking’s share  ‘un 
air de famille’ with the study of science in the French style (Braunstein 2008).   
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Dagognet.  It is uncontroversial that Gaston Bachelard is the core representative of historical 
epistemology, along with Georges Canguilhem. I also place François Dagognet in this 
tradition. This is not particularly original: Dagognet discussed themes that had been 
previously examined by those philosophers, and regularly referred to them. Indeed, he 
wrote extensively about Georges Canguilhem’s and Gaston Bachelard’s philosophies.3 More 
to the point, he presented himself as the inheritor of this French tradition in philosophy of 
science, and in fact has been seen as Bachelard’s and Canguilhem’s heir.4 Brunschvicg, on 
the other hand, is nowadays often neglected, and this is unfortunate, because the roots of 
historical epistemology are to be found in his work. I do not mean that the history of 
historical epistemology started with Brunschvicg. To assign a beginning to a group of 
philosophies, or indeed to any philosophy, would be rather pointless. To paraphrase what 
Bachelard wrote about rationalism:5 a philosophy never begins, but it always continues. But 
we have to start somewhere, and Brunschvicg’s work is a very meaningful starting point, 
both historically and normatively, as I shall briefly outline in the next section. Brunschvicg’s 
philosophy exhibits the central ingredients of historical epistemology, including the question 
on which I shall focus in this paper: the attempt to overcome the traditional philosophical 
opposition of reason and reality, and of idealism and materialism. I shall not approach this 
issue as a static aspect of this tradition. Rather, I shall follow the history of the search for 
this solution as a development away from idealism and towards materialism.  I shall start 
with Brunschvicg, and through Bachelard, arrive at Dagognet. Dagognet himself mentioned 
this evolution, as he argued that Bachelard continued Brunschvicg’s task to overcome the 
dichotomy of reason and reality, and that in so doing, he embarked upon a journey that 
took him away from Brunschvicg’s intellectualism.6 
 
Léon Brunschvicg and the roots of historical epistemology 
 
In Brunschvicg’s work we find the combination of the various ingredients that are the core 
of historical epistemology. First, the most obvious ingredient: the close relationship 
between philosophy and science, but not science in general as we find in so much 
philosophy of science, but very much one particular science at the time. He mainly, though 
not exclusively, concentrated on mathematics. For him, mathematics is the only language in 
which nature answers our questions;7 therefore there can be no scientific knowledge 
without it. For this reason, mathematization of knowledge is one of the criteria that he used 
in order to judge the progress of human knowledge. When knowledge relies on 
mathematics, for him there are advancements, as in seventeenth-century cosmology; when 
mathematics is forgotten, we see a return to what he called common-sense realism, and an 
involution of knowledge, as for instance with Aristotle.8 The second, and again rather 
                                                     
3  (Dagognet 1965b, 1985b, 1997). 
4 See for instance (Lecourt 2001, p. 113). 
5 (Bachelard 1986 [1949], p. 54). 
6  (Dagognet 1965a). 
7 (Brunschvicg 1951, p. 7). 
8 (Brunschvicg 1947, pp. 2-3, 47). 
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obvious, ingredient is the close relationship between philosophy and history of science. This 
is the core of his philosophy: he did not see science as static but rather as knowledge in 
evolution. His historical approach should not be confused with Comte’s: for Brunschvicg the 
history of science is open-ended, and does not obey any particular law. Consequently, its 
future cannot be predicted. 
Brunschvicg was not interested in the history of science for its own sake; he studied it in 
order to understand the mind.9 As he put it, history of science is to the philosopher what the 
laboratory is to the scientist.10 A better metaphor, however, would have been that of fossils 
that reveal the history of species, for he believed that the object that the philosopher 
studies, the mind, is changeable. And this brings us to the third element of Brunschvicg’s 
philosophy that is also central to large part of historical epistemology. This is the aim of 
writing the history of the mind.11 This enterprise makes sense only if one believes that the 
mind and its categories are not given once and for all. In his view, the changes that the mind 
undergoes could be observed in the history of science; non-Euclidean geometries and the 
theory of relativity were recent examples that testified to the mind’s historicity. For 
Brunschvicg, these episodes were particularly important because they showed that even 
Kant, a philosopher to whom he was particularly close, had made the mistake to think that 
the history of science had concluded its course with Newton. He had therefore believed that 
Newtonian science could be the model of knowledge on which to base a theory of reason 
without history. However, the history of science continued, and showed that time and space 
could no longer be seen as unchangeable a prioris. Philosophers should not make that 
mistake again, and think that future changes will not occur. On this point, Bachelard noted 
that Brunschvicg abandoned part of Kant’s philosophy, and understood that the ‘la doctrine 
d’un a priori absolu, immuable, stable, sans souplesse, ne correspondait plus à l’information 
scientifique’.12 Science shows the way in which we should understand the mind and 
knowledge, and science has an open-ended history. 
The fourth ingredient at the core of Brunschvicg’s philosophy and historical epistemology is 
the focus of my article: this is the aim to overcome the separation of reason and reality. For 
Brunschvicg, science shows that reason and reality cannot be separated, and that neither of 
them is immutable: their interaction changes both. As Bachelard emphasised, for 
Brunschvicg the detail of scientific experience has a deep impact on scientific theory, and on 
its coherence. Conversely, theory is applied in the search for increased experimental 
subtlety. There is no clear demarcation between the two, just as there is no clear separation 
between reason and reality. This was in accordance with what Bachelard himself believed, 
namely that ‘une doctrine de la science est désormais essentiellement… une doctrine de la 
transformation correlative de l’homme et des choses’.13 What Bachelard wrote about 
                                                     
9  Indeed, he wrote in a letter to George Sarton that he was not a historian of science, but rather a philosopher 
who studied la conscience (Brunschvicg 1923a). 
10 (Brunschvicg 1923b, p. 162). 
11 I argued that a vast group of research programmes, carried out by philosophers, historians of science, 
general historians, psychologists and ethnologists in France in the first half of the twentieth century were all 
aimed at writing the history of the mind (Chimisso 2008b). 
12  (Bachelard 1972, p. 172). 
13 (Bachelard 1951, p. 3). 
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Brunschvicg’s philosophy is certainly correct – he did not present an overly Bachelardian 
Brunschvicg, as it were. And yet, we cannot help but think that the manner in which 
Brunschvicg overcame the dichotomy of reason and reality tilts the balance in favour of 
reason. The prevalent role played by reason in Brunschvicg’s epistemology has its roots in 
mathematics. It can be argued that mathematics shaped his philosophy. It can be equally 
argued that he chose mathematics because it fit his philosophy, and both arguments can be 
valid at the same time. As he saw it, mathematics was the ideal science to understand how 
the mind works because in it ‘l’intelligence s’émancipe de l’horizon borne des 
representations sensibles’.14 For him, in mathematics the mind could be examined while 
working in a more autonomous way than in any other science. Incidentally, there is also an 
ethical and political inflection in Brunschvicg’s use of mathematics, which derives from the 
Enlightenment’s view of reason as instrument of justice: the purer the reason, the better 
the justice. Consistently with this view, Brunschvicg praised Condorcet’s use of mathematics 
to overcome inequalities.15 But why is the independence of the mind required? If, as 
Brunschvicg believed, mind and reality change each other through their interaction, 
shouldn’t we observe the interaction from both points of view? The problem is that 
Brunschvicg did not think that there were really two points of view, namely reason and 
reality. He did not believe that a mind-independent reality – the thing-in-itself, in Kantians 
terms – existed; and even if it did, he argued, we could not know it, so it would be of no 
interest to us.16 However, this means that the dialectic between reason and reality appears 
to be internal to the mind. Brunschvicg was aware of this, and in fact he never stopped 
presenting his own philosophy as a form of idealism17. 
 
From Brunschvicg to Bachelard 
 
Bachelard acknowledged that he followed the path opened by Brunschvicg, and, like the 
latter, he focused on overcoming the dichotomy of reason and reality. For all his 
acknowledgement of the teaching of his professor, however, differences between their 
respective approaches are apparent. The first, and most noticeable, difference between 
Brunschvicg and Bachelard is that for the latter mathematics was not the model of scientific 
reasoning. He mostly focused on physics and chemistry.18 The importance of the science of 
choice in historical epistemology is complex. I have mentioned that one of the element of 
historical epistemology is the centrality not of science in general but of one science in 
particular, in its historical development. However, Brunschvicg believed that mathematics 
was the model for the other sciences and for logic. His study of a specific science did not 
lead him to the conclusion that reason may work in different ways depending on the specific 
                                                     
14 (Brunschvicg 1912, p. x). 
15 (Brunschvicg 1947, p. 116). 
16 (Brunschvicg 1921: 47-48). 
17 (Brunschvicg 1923b, p. 170). 
18 For the importance of chemistry in French philosophy of science, including Bachelard, see (Bensaude-
Vincent 2005); see also (Chimisso 2014) for the role of chemistry in Bachelard’s philosophy.  
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science. By contrast, Bachelard took the specificity of the individual sciences very seriously, 
and proposed a liberal and open view of scientific rationality with his concept of regional 
rationalism.19 If rationality has different regions, then the study of each of them can 
contribute something distinctive. Bachelard’s sciences of choice, physics and chemistry, 
provided him with a very different perspective from Brunschvicg’s mathematics. The mind 
could not work independently at all in these sciences, or, to be more precise, in these 
sciences as Bachelard saw them. I would like to emphasise that like all philosophers, 
Bachelard constructed his objects – physics and chemistry – just as for him scientists 
construct scientific objects. This is important, also because an easy objection to what I am 
arguing is that, although Brunschvicg regarded mathematics as the best science to study 
from an epistemological point of view, physics was also important to him, as his work 
attests.20 However, Émile Meyerson had a point when he suggested to Brunschvicg that 
mathematics dominated the latter’s way of looking at science in general. Unsurprisingly, 
Brunschvicg rejected Meyerson’s suggestion, and retorted that his own view of physics was 
different from Meyerson’s.21 Brunschvicg’s answer, however, was not very satisfactory. On 
the one hand, he claimed something that in my view is true: philosophers construct their 
objects differently, and Brunschvicg’s and Meyerson’s physics are indeed different. On the 
other hand, his answer did not directly address Meyerson’s point; it can well be argued that 
Brunschvicg’s physics is constructed on the model of mathematics. However, this is a large 
issue that I do not have the space to discuss here. The point is that there is a circular 
interaction in philosophy of science between the science studied and the epistemological 
representation of said science.  
Much attention has been dedicated to how differently Brunschvicg and Bachelard on the 
one hand, and Meyerson on the other, regarded the sciences. Brunschvicg and Bachelard 
themselves emphasised their distance from Meyerson’s philosophy on numerous occasions. 
But in fact, Brunschvicg and Bachelard constructed their objects, including physics and its 
history, in different ways.  The revolution of the theory of relativity struck Bachelard as 
much as it did Brunschvicg, and arguably more, leading him to formulate one of his most 
distinctive concepts, that of rupture épistémologique. However, for Brunschvicg those 
revolutions were mainly theoretical, whereas for Bachelard they also brought about new 
objects and phenomena.  As mentioned, Brunschvicg believed that it makes little sense to 
focus on a mind-independent reality; for him what we should focus on is what appears to 
us, namely phenomena. Bachelard also focused on phenomena, but for him phenomena are 
rather different from what Brunschvicg intended. Bachelard’s ‘phenomena’ are not Kantian 
phenomena, what appears to us, but rather what science calls phenomena, new events that 
are created, controlled and manipulated in the laboratory. His view is best illustrated by his 
concept of phénoménotechnique, which he introduced in a general discussion about 
                                                     
19 (Bachelard 1986 [1949], Chapter 7). 
20 (Brunschvicg 1922). 
21 (Brunschvicg and al. 1921, pp. 59-60). 
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scientific concepts,22 and refined it in his analysis of modern physics.23 In 
phénoménotechnique, he wrote, no phenomenon appears naturally, no phenomenon is a 
given. In modern physics, ‘[l’]ontologie [est] conditionnée par l’expérience technique’.24 
Indeed, for him ‘[u]n concept est devenu scientifique dans la proportion où il est devenu 
technique, où il est accompagné d’une technique de réalisation’.25 The structure of nature 
itself has a human and technical character: Bachelard argued that ‘le veritable ordre de la 
Nature, c’est l’ordre que nous mettons techniquement dans la Nature’26 Chemistry, in my 
view even more than physics, supports the material character of knowledge, and shows that 
separating reason and reality is impossible. Chemistry does not only change the way in 
which we think about matter, but also transforms matter, and creates new substances, 
which reason alone could never envisage. Bachelard wrote that chemistry’s ‘matérialisme 
technique n’est nullement un réalisme philosophique’,27 as the latter would still imply the 
separation of mind and object, and would not include the historical productivity of human 
actions. For Bachelard modern chemistry illustrates that scientific objects are both rationally 
and technically produced. 
Bachelard introduced the technical production of material objects into historical 
epistemology, and in so doing he led the project of integrating reason and reality away from 
idealism. Dagognet was an attentive reader of Bachelard’s original solution to the problem 
of the overcoming of the dichotomy between reason and reality, and emphasised that 
Bachelard never ceased ‘de s’éloigner de l’intellectualisme de style brunschvicgien’.28 It is 
noteworthy that he called Brunschvicg’s philosophy intellectualism, as he aimed to stress 
what for him is the contemplative and analytical character of Brunschvicg’s rationalism, as 
opposed to a rationalism of work and production.29 For Dagognet, Bachelard took historical 
epistemology away from contemplation and analysis and towards facticity, production and 
work. Indeed, Dagognet read the development of Bachelard’s own philosophy as a journey 
from an early idealism towards a rational materialism, a point that Pariente has 
subsequently developed in more detail.30 Bachelard certainly brought the technical 
productivity of science into philosophy, but all the same his emphasis was often on the 
rational character of scientific objects. Bachelard’s enterprise is still a history of the mind, 
even though the mind for him knows through technical applications, and operates by 
bringing new material objects into the world. For him, the activity of science is above all a 
rational activity; in the Activité rationaliste de la physique contemporaine Bachelard 
mentions his concept of bibliomène, which is not completely tongue-in-cheek. He claimed 
that the electron has a more solid existence than the moon, as it is mentioned in many more 
                                                     
22 (Bachelard 1993 [1938], p. 61). 
23 (Bachelard 1951); (Bachelard 1986 [1949]); (Bachelard 1991 [1934], p. 17); (Bachelard 1993 [1938], p. 61); 
on this topic, see also (Castelão-Lawless 1998); (Rheinberger 2005a); (Chimisso 2008a).  
24 (Bachelard, 1951, p. 82) 
25 (Bachelard, 1993[1938], p. 61) 
26 (Bachelard, 1991 [1934], p. 111). 
27 (Bachelard 1986 [1949], p. 8). 
28 (Dagognet 1984, p. 113). 
29 (Dagognet 1965a, p. 53) 
30 (Dagognet 1984, p. 113); (Pariente 2006). 
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books than the latter.31 Similarly, he emphasised that ‘la chimie a désormais la coherence 
des livres, la permanence des énormes bibliothèques!’.32 The journey of the integration of 
rational and real advanced from Brunschvicg to Bachelard, but it did not stop there. 
 
Dagognet on the journey towards materialism 
  
Dagognet noted that both Bachelard and Brunschvicg criticised Meyerson because for his 
separation of reason and reality. He commented, however, that Meyerson should not have 
been singled out for criticism, as the separation of réel et le rationnel est ‘l’éternel péché de 
la philosophie’.33 Indeed, for him arguably the problem of the separation of rationality and 
reality is the main problem of philosophy. His aim to overcome this separation is very much 
in line with Brunschvicg’s and Bachelard’s philosophies. Bachelard had pursued that 
objective by pulling away from Brunschvicg’s idealism, and bringing matter into historical 
epistemology; Dagognet pulled further away from idealism, and attached more importance 
to matter. He argued that matter has been neglected, and, to correct this, he shifted 
emphasis and point of view. Bachelard interpreted the history of science as a history of 
increased rationalisation; this rationalisation included matter. By contrast, Dagognet re-read 
the history of science and philosophy from the point of view of matter. He argued that 
modern science and technology lead us to conceive matter in a new way. The creation of 
artificial textiles is one of the many examples of how matter is created. Biomaterials show 
how the gap between life and matter has been bridged. The genome map for Dagognet is 
another example of the materiality of life. And again we delegate to machines – that is 
computers – operations that not long ago seemed exclusively human.34 For him matter, life 
and thought are three strata of a unity.35 
In his journey towards an increased materialism, Dagognet followed the central precept of 
historical epistemology: that philosophy should follow science. For him modern science has 
shown the way for the rehabilitation of materialism. On this point, he often quoted 
Bachelard, especially Le matérialisme rationnel, but in fact he went well beyond this work as 
far as the concept of matter is concerned. Bachelard’s materialism is always rational, and for 
him rationality belongs to science. It is in Le matérialisme rationnel that Bachelard once 
again emphasised the anthropological split between the diurnal and nocturnal human being, 
between imagination et raison, and the corresponding two types of materialism, le 
matérialisme imaginaire et le matérialisme instruit. For him, there is a rupture 
épistémologique between these two types of materialism, just as there is a rupture 
épistémologique between connaissance commune et connaissance scientifique.36 Only the 
                                                     
31 (Bachelard 1951). 
32 (Bachelard 1972 [1953], p. 6). 
33 (Dagognet 1965a, p. 46). 
34 (Dagognet 1985a); (Dagognet 2000). 
35 (Dagognet 2000, p. 13). 
36 (Bachelard 1972 [1953]) (Bachelard 1986 [1949]). 
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matérialisme scientifique is a materialism that manipulates matter and produces matter. 
The nocturnal, poetic situation regards matter only as imagined substances, and it is in fact 
an imagined, and indeed immaterial materialism. Dagognet wrote about these two sides of 
Bachelard’s work, and emphasised that they are expression of two worlds: the diurnal and 
rational world on the one hand, and the nocturnal and oneiric world on the other. Dagognet 
commented: ‘Aucun raccord possible: ces deux mondes que Bachelard a explorés ne 
peuvent que s’exclure et se repousser….’.37 He also remarked that the gap that Bachelard 
posed between rational and oneiric life in fact increased in his late works.38 In contrast with 
Bachelard, Dagognet aimed to reconcile these two types of materialism. For him there is a 
materialism of chemistry and of technology, but there also is an authentic materialism in 
art, and indeed in all aspects of our lives.39 Dagognet followed science, technology, 
production of merchandise, art and other human activities; for him the ruptures that 
Bachelard saw between these different domains appeared in fact far less clear-cut. I have 
emphasised that chemistry suggested to Bachelard a materiality that mathematics could not 
to Brunschvicg; a similar contrast could also be drawn between Bachelard’s interest in 
poetry and Dagognet’s interest in visual arts. The matter of visual arts is not imagined 
matter as is that of poetry. Like Brunschvicg and Bachelard before him, Dagognet aimed to 
overcome the dichotomy of reason and reality. In order to do so, he considered the issue 
from the point of view of matter, which he no longer considered as subordinated to reason. 
In other words, he continued the trend towards materialism that can be traced from 
Brunschvicg to Bachelard. 
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